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Abstract: One of the fundamental mobile phone security problems in GSM is the absence of 
base station authentication, which allows man-in-the-middle attacks. During such attacks, a 
third party activates a fake base station, which acts as a bypass to the network, thus switching 
off the encryption and intercepting the user’s communications. 3G mobile networks enforce 
mutual authentication but this can be circumvented if the 3G band is jammed by the attacker, 
forcing  the  phone  to  connect  using GSM. GSM and newer standards provide a user alert 
indicating that the encryption has been switched off, which is called a Ciphering Indicator. In 
the  present  paper,  different  approaches  followed  by  various  manufacturers  concerning  the 
Ciphering Indicator are investigated. A total of 38 different mobile phones ranging from old to 
new and from simple to smart-phones that were produced by 13 different manufacturers were 
intercepted using a GSM testing device in order to document their reactions. Four approaches 
were identified with some manufacturers choosing not to implement the feature at all.  It was 
also  found  that  in  the  cases  in  which  the  feature  was  actually  implemented,  no  universal 
indication was used and it was seldom documented in the phones’ manuals. User awareness 
regarding the Ciphering Indicator and security issues was also investigated via an empirical 
survey employing more than 7,000 users from 10 countries and was found to be significantly 
low. 
 
Keywords : Ciphering Indicator, graphical user interface, mobile phone, fake base station 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
One  of  the fundamental security problems and a basic shortcoming regarding GSM security 
planning is the fact that mobile telephone base stations do not have to authenticate themselves to the 
user [1]. A user wishing to gain access to a provider's GSM mobile telephone network must own the 
proper SIM card and have it inserted in his or her phone device. The user's authentication is therefore  
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performed by comparing the SIM’s credentials with the data stored in the network's database [2]. A 
base station authentication mechanism, however, is not employed and mobile phones are not capable of 
assessing the legitimacy of the system they are connecting to, nor certifying whether this system is 
indeed part of their provider's network. Therefore, a fake base station can easily present itself as a part 
of the victim provider’s network. 
Furthermore,  mobile  phones  constantly monitor a special data transmission beacon from the 
nearby  base  stations  (through  the  broadcast  control  channel  -  BCCH)  in  order  to  choose  the  one 
offering  the  strongest  signal  for  their  communication  [3].  This  way,  they  can  achieve  better 
communication quality, economise the amount of energy consumed and increase their autonomy time. 
Hence,  if  the  attacker  installs  his  or  her  equipment  in  a  nearby  area  and  starts  transmitting, 
masquerading  as  a  legitimate  operator  and  overlapping  the  authentic  base  stations’  signals,  mobile 
phones  of  that  specific  operator  located  nearby  will  choose  the  fake  base  station  for  their 
communication.  
The next stage of the attack would be to neutralise the encryption. GSM uses an A5 algorithm 
for voice encryption [4]. There exist various versions of this algorithm that offer different levels of 
security (A5/2, A5/1, A5/3 – listed in strength order from lowest to highest), as well as a version with 
no  encryption  at  all  (A5/0)  [5].  Under  normal  circumstances,  the  network  has  stored  in  its 
Authentication Centre’s (AuC) database a secret key, Ki, which is also stored in the user's SIM card and 
is never transmitted in the network. These keys are compared by using a signed response (SRES) with 
the help of algorithm A3 and thus, the mobile phone is authenticated [6]. Finally, using the Ki and other 
data, the A8 algorithm produces the session encryption key, Kc, which is used in the speech encryption 
algorithm, A5 [6]. In the case of the fake base station, the basic information of the Ki key is not known 
to the attacker. Hence, the attack cannot proceed. However, the system planning prioritises usability 
instead  of  security  in  this  case.  As  such,  the  corresponding  protocols  allow  the  negotiation  and 
agreement between the mobile phone and the base station regarding whether they will use an encryption 
algorithm and which one they will use [6].  Therefore, sending the proper signal, the fake base station 
may  inform  the  mobile  phone  that  it  does  not  have  any  encryption  capabilities  (A5/0)  and  that 
communication should take place without the use of encryption. 
With  encryption  switched  off, the attacker can act as a man-in-the-middle and intercept the 
communication of the target phone. Following this, using a simple mobile or fixed telephone, he can 
relay the call back to the genuine network and to the intended recipient, recording the communication in 
the process [7]. It is worth noting that 3G mobile networks enforce the mutual authentication scheme 
[8], which means that an authentication of the base station is required, eliminating fake base station 
attacks  in  practice.  However,  this  can  be  circumvented  if  the  3G  band  is  jammed by the attacker. 
Indeed, when a multi-band-capable mobile handset loses 3G signal connectivity, it will try to connect to 
older networks (2.5G and 2G) present in the area, thanks to backward compatibility. Therefore, even 
3G users may fall victim to a fake base station attack. In addition, many users still prefer not to connect 
to 3G networks because of the increased power consumption and the shorter autonomy time of the 
handset [9] 
Even though the industry and researchers have shown an active interest in enhancing the mobile 
phone user experience, offering more and more services and a wealth of applications [10-13], the user 
notification issue regarding encryption being switched off, as well as user awareness of the matter, has 
not yet been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, the history of GSM standards regarding this issue,  
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the different approaches followed by manufacturers and user awareness regarding this issue are widely 
investigated by employing a data set of 38 different models, 13 different manufacturers and 7,172 users. 
 
METHODS  
 
A GSM tester was used to intercept 38 different phones from 13 different manufacturers in 
order to identify their reaction when under attack (implementing the Ciphering Indicator or not) and 
also to investigate whether the matter has been documented in their manuals. User awareness was also 
investigated via a survey of 7,172 university students from 10 different EU countries. To formulate the 
process, the history of GSM standards regarding this issue was researched. 
 
History of Ciphering Indicator in GSM Standards 
 
It took several years for an alert informing the user of the loss of encryption to be included in the 
GSM standards. The first notion of this alert for a lack of encryption (albeit not explicitly stated as 
‘encryption’)  in  the  GSM  standards  was  in  1997  [14],  when  a  cryptic  operational  feature  monitor 
(OFM) bit was mentioned. That bit controlled the OFM attribute, as shown in Figure 1, but the meaning 
of the term OFM was not explained in the abbreviations or elsewhere in the text.  
 
 
Figure 1. The first occurrence of the OFM bit in the standards 
 
A Ciphering Indicator was introduced a few months after the first mention of the OFM and it 
was clearly stated that a notification should show the user the lack of data confidentiality [15]. It was 
also stated that the Ciphering Indicator feature should be mandatory, enabled by default, and potentially 
switched off via the respective SIM setting controlled by the network operator [15, 16]. As such, even 
if a handset has implemented the feature, the operator is able to instruct it not to alert the user in the 
case of a loss of encryption. 
In  1999,  the  OFM  term  was  described  as an  Operational  Feature  Monitor,  and it was also 
explained that the OFM bit is indeed used to turn the Ciphering Indicator on and off [17].  In 2004, the  
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OFM term was abandoned in favour of the more straightforward Ciphering Indicator term [18], as 
shown in Figure 2.  In 2009, further clarification of the feature was provided, and it was stated that 
phones with a suitable user interface should offer the user the capability to override Ciphering Indicator 
setting set by the operator [19]. This standard seems to be the first step towards actually empowering 
the  user  to  overcome  the  control  of  the  operator  regarding  Ciphering  Indicator,  although  such 
technology has yet to be widely embraced. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. OFM is officially replaced by the Ciphering Indicator term 
 
Phone Interception 
 
In order to test mobile phones’ behaviours with regard to Ciphering Indicator, a professional 
GSM  testing  device  [20],  shown  in  Figure  3,  was  used.  The  GSM  tester  provides  all  necessary 
signalling to the mobile phone in the same way as a base station does, enabling us to perform our tests. 
The  experimental  set-up  consisted  of  the  GSM  tester,  properly  configured,  and  an  antenna.  The 
required settings for the parameterisation of the GSM tester are mobile country code (MCC), mobile 
network code (MNC), channel number (ARFCN) on which the broadcast control channel (BCCH) is 
transmitted and the traffic channel (TCH) on which the actual communication takes place. It should be 
noted that all MCCs are publicly available information [21]. In order not to interfere with any legitimate 
networks, a specially designated test-only network was used (a combination of MCC 001 and MNC 
01), as shown in Figure 4. The encryption capability was deactivated by choosing algorithm A5/0, and a 
test call was initiated by the handset in order to test for the presence of an indication. The international 
mobile equipment identity (IMEI) of the target phone was logged, as shown in Figure 5, in order to 
deduce the exact phone model.  
For every handset tested, two SIM cards from two different providers were used: one with 
Ciphering Indicator feature enabled and the other with Ciphering Indicator feature disabled. The former 
was used in order to test the manufacturer’s approach regarding the indicator (whether implemented or 
not) and the latter was used to test whether the operator’s setting was actually followed by the handset. 
By adding a mobile handset with monitoring software installed, a second mobile phone, in order 
to channel the interception communication through it and a PC, the setup could be used to actually 
intercept communication before relaying it to the original recipient. More details about the experimental 
set-up and the process can be found in the author’s previous paper [7].   
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Figure 3. Mobile phone tester 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Designated test-only network in the available networks list 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Fake base station has extracted the mobile subscriber and mobile equipment identification as 
well as the number that the user intends to call (444444). Ciphering is switched off, as shown.  
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User Awareness Survey 
 
To  investigate  user  awareness  regarding  Ciphering  Indicator,  a  large-scale  survey  of  user 
security habits and trends was employed. The survey started in 2009 with a small sample of students 
from  the  University  of  Ioannina,  Greece  [22]  and  eventually  resulted  in  a  large  sample  of  7,172 
university  students  from  17  different  universities  located  in  10  different  European  countries,  i.e. 
Hungary, Czech, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia [23, 
24].  
Multiple-choice  questionnaires  were  used,  employing  an  in-person  delivery  technique.  Data 
entry took place using custom optical mark recognition (OMR) software, which enabled the processing 
of the questionnaires in a very rapid and accurate manner, avoiding human data entry mistakes [25]. 
Statistical processing took place using the SPSS analysis tool [26]. The aspect of the questionnaire 
considered in this paper is the awareness of Ciphering Indicator along with the brand used, because 
different brands follow different approaches. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
 
Implementation of Ciphering Indicator in Different Brands 
 
To acquire a wide view of the behaviour of phones during man-in-the-middle attacks, a group of 
38 different mobile phones from 13 different manufacturers covering a large time span (from 2002 to 
2010) was investigated. 
In the case of SIMs with Ciphering Indicator feature enabled, four different approaches followed 
by the manufacturers were identified and are shown in Table 1.  Nine different manufacturers in the 
considered dataset (Sharp, Samsung, Qtek, HTC, Motorola, LG, Huawei, Chinabuye and Apple) did 
not employ a Ciphering Indicator, although this is required by the standards, an approach which was 
identified as “Approach 0”. Furthermore, a universal indication was not employed by the manufacturers 
that did incorporate a Ciphering Indicator. One manufacturer in the considered dataset (Siemens) used 
stars and an explanation mark (an approach identified as “Approach 1”). Two others (ZTE and Nokia) 
used an open-padlock (an approach identified as “Approach 2”). Another manufacturer (Sony Ericsson) 
used  an  exclamation  mark  inside  a  red  triangle  or  a  grey  square,  along  with  an  explanatory  text 
message, an approach identified as “Approach 3”. Although there is inconsistency regarding the icon 
used in this approach (triangle or square), the presence of the accompanying text should be able to clear 
up any confusion. The text itself has been amended in more recent models to be more descriptive, as 
shown in Table 1. However, this informative message would disappear after a few seconds in eight out 
of the eleven cases considered, leaving only the icon present for the rest of the call. Only in three of the 
cases studied did the manufacturer choose to follow a more robust implementation, requiring that the 
user specifically acknowledge reading the message. 
The  documentation  of  Ciphering  Indicator  in  manuals  of  the  considered  phones  was  also 
investigated. It was found that the presence or the meaning of the possible icons used as a Ciphering 
Indicator was mostly not documented. As shown in Table 1, proper documentation for the Ciphering 
Indicator was rather rare and only one manufacturer (Sony Ericsson) in the considered data set included 
it while this was done in only three out of its eleven models in the considered group. Quite interestingly, 
this manufacturer also used an explanatory message in addition to the icon and therefore it was the one 
that least needed to include such documentation in the phones’ manuals. Another manufacturer (Nokia) 
documented, in three different cases, that a closed padlock icon shows that the data services (e.g. WAP  
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and WiFi) use encryption and that the absence of this icon indicates a lack of encryption, but Nokia has 
provided no documentation regarding the open padlock icon for voice and text communication. As an 
example, the way the icon of Approach 3 is explained in the respective phone manual is shown in Figure 
6.  
 
Table 1.  Examples of different implementations of the Ciphering Indicator 
 
Approach  Brand 
 
Ciphering 
Indicator 
Example of phone GUI  Documented 
0 
Sharp 
Samsung 
Qtek  
HTC 
LG 
Motorola 
Huawei 
Chinabuye 
Apple 
No indicator 
 
n/a (19 cases) 
1  Siemens 
Stars and an 
exclamation 
mark 
 
 
 
0/2 cases 
2 
ZTE  
Nokia  Open padlock 
 
 
 
0/6 cases 
3  Sony 
Ericsson 
Exclamation 
mark inside a 
grey square or 
a red triangle, 
along with a 
text message 
 
 
 
 
 
3/11 cases  
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Figure 6.  Examples of the documented Ciphering Indicator (Approach 3) 
 
At this point, it is interesting to examine the behaviour of the so-called ‘smartphones’. These 
phones have advanced operating systems that allow a myriad of applications to be installed, minimising 
the  gap  between  mobile  phones  and  PCs.  Our  sample  encompassed  smartphones  with  four  main 
operating systems (Android, iOS, Windows Mobile, and Symbian). It was found that only Symbian had 
implemented a Ciphering Indicator. This could possibly be attributed to the fact that Symbian is closely 
related  to  Nokia,  a  telecom  manufacturer  that  has  been  using  a Ciphering  Indicator  since its early 
models, whereas the other advanced operating systems have evolved out of the computer community 
(i.e. Windows Mobile, Android and iOS). It should also be noted that in the case of Android, a similar 
icon with the Approach 3 implementation of the Ciphering Indicator (a triangle with an exclamation 
mark) is used as a general notification icon, as shown in Figure 7, but it is not used to alert the user 
when the encryption is switched off. 
Handsets using a SIM with the Ciphering Indicator feature switched off were also tested. It was 
found that all phones obeyed the network operator setting, with the exception of one. This occurrence 
should probably be attributed to a bug and not to a general manufacturer approach, because a later 
model from the same manufacturer had no such issues. Further, it should be noted that a phone that 
allowed the user to override the network operator setting for the Ciphering Indicator was not found in 
the considered group. A detailed report for each phone tested which contained the manufacturer, the 
model, the IMEI, the manufacturer’s approach and an indication whether the Ciphering Indicator was 
documented can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Manufacturers’ approach regarding Ciphering Indicator 
 
  Brand  Model  IMEI  Approach 
Ciphering 
Indicator 
documented 
Year 
Launched 
1  Nokia  1600  35 89 5801…   2  No  2006 
2  Nokia  3510i  35 14 6280…  2  No  2002 
3  Nokia  6510  35 11 0510…  2  No  2002 
4  Nokia  5000  35 67 9702…  2  No  2008 
5  Nokia  E71  35 82 4003  2  No  2008 
6  Sony Ericsson  T610  35 12 5300…  3  Yes  2003 
7  Sony Ericsson  T200  35 04 0345…  3  Yes  2002 
8  Sony Ericsson  K810i  35 94 5101…  3  No  2007 
9  Sony Ericsson  W810i  35 94 5701…  3  No  2006 
10  Sony Ericsson  K770i  35 61 7902…  3  No  2007 
11  Sony Ericsson  K750i  35 93 0200…  3  No  2005 
12  Sony Ericsson  W595  3529 6503 …  3*  No  2008 
13  Sony Ericsson  W700i  35 52 7101…  3  Yes  2006 
14  Sony Ericsson  K630i  35 88 0101…  3*  No  2007 
15  Sony Ericsson  W705  35 18 0603…  3  No  2008 
16  Sony Ericsson  C902  35 87 9002...  3*  No  2008 
17  Sharp  GX17  35 97 9100…  0  n/a  2005 
18  Samsung  E1080  35 80 3703…  0  n/a  2010 
19  Samsung  SGH-E570  35 49 9201…  0  n/a  2006 
20  Samsung  E1310  35 42 3703…  0  n/a  2009 
21  Samsung  C3050  35 55 2803…  0  n/a  2009 
22  Samsung  SGH-J700  35 26 9302…  0  n/a  2008 
23  Samsung  SGH-E250  35 60 7501…  0  n/a  2006 
24  Siemens  S55  35 10 8352…  1  No  2002 
25  Siemens  S65  35 39 1200…  1  No  2004 
26  Qtek (HTC)  S200  35 70 3600…  0  n/a  2006 
27  HTC  Wildfire  35 90 2803…  0  n/a  2010 
28  Motorola  C115  35 64 9800…  0  n/a  2004 
29  Motorola  U9  35 87 9801…  0  n/a  2007 
30  LG  KP500 cookie  35 91 3103…  0  n/a  2008 
31  LG  KP105  35 79 4002…  0  n/a  2008 
32  LG  GB108  35 71 4503…  0  n/a  2009 
33  LG  KU990 Viewty  35 90 3603…  0  n/a  2007 
34  LG  GU230  35 72 4503…  0  n/a  2010 
35  ZTE  340  35 59 2203…  2  No  2009 
36  Huawei  Joy 845  35 16 0204…  0  n/a  2010 
37  Chinabuye  H969  35 73 6903…  0  n/a  2010 
38  Apple  iPhone 3G  01 20 2300…  0  n/a  2008 
*Alerting text accompanying Ciphering Indicator should be acknowledged by user 
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Figure 7. Use of a triangle with an exclamation mark as a general notification icon (Android) 
 
User Awareness 
  
Examining the user element, the awareness of the issue was found to be significantly low in the 
considered sample. This can be attributed to various manufacturers not employing the feature and also 
to the lack of proper documentation in the case of the manufacturers that do employ it. Since different 
manufacturers follow different approaches regarding the Ciphering Indicator, the market share of each 
brand is an important issue in terms of investigating user awareness. As our survey revealed, the two 
most popular brands (Nokia and Sony Ericsson) in the considered sample, which were used by 64.1% 
of the students, employ a Ciphering Indicator (Figure 8). However, the user awareness in this sample 
was significantly low (only 24,9% were aware of the indicator feature). This can be partly attributed to 
manufacturers  not  employing  this  feature  and  also  to  the  lack  of  proper  documentation  by  the 
manufacturers that do employ a Ciphering Indicator, because a large percentage of users that had a 
Ciphering Indicator feature enabled in their phones were still unaware of the meaning of the icon used.  
Our fundamental empirical questions involved whether students are informed about how the 
options and the technical characteristics of their mobile phones affect their security and how secure they 
consider communication using mobile phones. Students answered those two questions subjectively. We 
also used some objective questions in regard to security practices (noting IMEI, using a PIN, using a 
password-protected screen saver, using antivirus software, and making backups). In this way, we were 
able to conclude whether their subjective answers were actually aligned with the objective facts. 
When  answering  the  question  “Are  you  informed  about  how  the  options  and  technical 
characteristics of your mobile phone affect its security?”, the majority of students (30.8%) stated that 
they were ‘moderately’ informed about the security options and characteristics, while 15.8% believed 
that they were ‘not at all’ informed. We proceeded to weigh the responses with the following weights: 
Very Much: 4, Much: 3, Moderately: 2, Not much: 1, Not at all: 0. Then, we divided them by the 
number of occurrences in order to obtain an arithmetic value and better compare the results (Figure 9). 
It was proved that LG and Samsung users are the most in need of security education because they  
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scored the lowest on the 0-4 scale (1.74 and 1.73 respectively). Nokia (1.85) is around the total mean 
(1.86). iPhone and Ericsson users are the most informed ones (1.97 and 1.95 respectively).  
Continuing with a general question about how ‘secure’ users felt mobile phone communication 
is, the majority (36.9%) replied ‘moderately’ , followed by ‘much’ at 28.6%. On the other hand, some 
(21.36%) felt not too much or not at all sure they were safe. Weighting with the same scale (0-4),  the 
results were obtained as shown in Figure 10. It can be seen that iPhone users were the ones that are 
most ‘suspicious’ in regard to how safe they consider mobile phone communication to be. Sharp users 
were more relaxed. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. User awareness and percentages of the brands used in the considered samples 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Brand and security awareness 
 
 
 
Awareness  of 
Ciphering 
Indicator  
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Figure 10.  Brand and security feeling 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In  this  paper,  38  different  mobile  phone  models  from  13  different  manufacturers  were 
intercepted in order to investigate the implementation of the Ciphering Indicator feature, which aims to 
alert users of switched-off encryption and possible interceptions. The documentation of the feature (or 
the absence of it) in various phones’ manuals was also examined. In addition, user awareness regarding 
this feature and other security issues was surveyed by using the results of an empirical study employing 
a sample of 7,172 university students from 10 European countries.  
Four approaches were followed by the manufacturers in the considered group regarding the 
Ciphering Indicator feature, ranging from no feature implementation to use of icons and an explanatory 
message. In the case of smartphones, phones with four different operating systems were tested and only 
one of them was found to implement the Ciphering Indicator feature. In general, the approach of each 
manufacturer seemed not to change over time, although one minor inconsistency was reported. The 
documentation of Ciphering Indicator in the considered phones’ manuals was also investigated. It was 
found  that  the  presence  or  the  meaning  of  the  icons  used  as  a  Ciphering  Indicator  was  rarely 
documented.  Finally,  when  examining  the  user  element,  awareness  of  the  issue  was  found  to  be 
significantly low in the considered sample.  
Although  the  Ciphering  Indicator  is  a  simple  and  efficient  tool  to  alert  users  of  possible 
communication  interceptions,  it  seems  to  be  neglected by  both  the  industry  and  users. The  results 
described in this paper emphasise the issue and can be employed to enhance awareness in both parties, 
considering the fact that security in mobile communications is an issue of growing concern. 
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